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THE OTHER PATH OF CONSTITUTIONALISM
Miguel Schor*
A.V. DICEY, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM (J.W.F. Allison, ed., 2013). Pp.
400. Hardcover $ 119.85.
STEPHEN GARDBAUM, THE NEW COMMONWEALTH MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONALISM:
THEORY AND PRACTICE (2013). Pp. 270. Hardcover $ 88.12.
INTRODUCTION
Although constitutional experts no longer believe the United States Constitution to
be the preeminent constitutional model for new democracies to emulate,1 the core features
of the Constitution such as writtenness, constitutional entrenchment, and judicial review
have become universal.2 The American revolutionaries articulated a set of grievances that
revolved around the British government’s failure to respect liberty3 and proposed as a solution that constitutions should be written and difficult to change. 4 Although judicial review was not hardwired into the text of the Constitution, it has become accepted as a means
to effectuate constitutional limits.5 In short, a liberal democracy without a written and entrenched constitution policed by judges has become (almost) unthinkable.
There is one highly successful, albeit non-influential, exception to American constitutional hegemony. The British constitution sits athwart the path of global constitutionalism and consequently has long bedeviled comparative constitutional theorists who do not

* Professor of Law, Drake University School of Law.
1. See David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States Constitution, 87 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 762 (2012).
2. See id. See also GEORGE ATHAN BILLIAS, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM HEARD AROUND THE
WORLD, 1789-1989 (2009).
3. See generally JACK P. GREENE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2011);
BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967).
4. GORDON S. WOOD, THE IDEA OF AMERICA: REFLECTIONS ON THE BIRTH OF THE UNITED STATES 171-80
(2011); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
5. The success of the Supreme Court’s attempt to wrest control over the meaning of the Constitution was
not guaranteed. The exercise of judicial review faced considerable opposition in the early days of the Republic.
See DWIGHT WILEY JESSUP, REACTION AND ACCOMMODATION: THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND
POLITICAL CONFLICT 1809-1835 (1987). The dramatic expansion of judicial review during the Lochner era also
aroused considerable political opposition. See Miguel Schor, Constitutional Dialogue and Judicial Supremacy,
(Drake Univ. Law Sch. Research Paper No. 12-02, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1730202.
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quite know what to make of British exceptionalism. 6 While the American constitution provides a legible template for how a constitution might preserve liberty, the same cannot be
said of the British constitution, which is largely illegible to outsiders as it is found scattered
in court cases, statutes, and political understandings called conventions. It is a common
law constitution.7 There is no single document, as Thomas Paine pointed out in the eighteenth century,8 that is called the British constitution. If longevity is the touchstone of a
successful constitution, however, the British constitution’s lack of global influence is puzzling.9
Two recently published works of comparative constitutionalism seek to remedy Britain’s constitutional isolation. A.V. Dicey was the Vinerian Professor of English Law at
Oxford University in the late nineteenth century when he wrote what became the most
important work on the British constitution, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the
Constitution.10 Dicey’s comparative work, however, consisted of a series of lectures given
primarily between 1895 and 1900 that remained unpublished until 2013. Professor J.W.F.
Allison, University of Cambridge Faculty of Law, is to be commended for editing these
lectures so that Oxford University Press could publish them as A.V. Dicey’s Comparative
Constitutionalism.11 Stephen Gardbaum, the MacArthur Foundation Professor of International Justice and Human Rights at the University of California Los Angeles School of
Law, is a twenty-first century comparative constitutionalist theorist. His work on judicial
review in the British Commonwealth—The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism12—is a seminal work that will undoubtedly influence scholars around the globe. These
two monographs illuminate why constitutional theorists should pay attention to British
constitutionalism.
BRITAIN’S EXCEPTIONAL CONSTITUTION
Writing a full century after the American Revolution, A.V. Dicey understood that
the sun was setting on the global influence of British constitutionalism, as written constitutions were superseding unwritten ones around the globe.13 Dicey turned to comparative
constitutionalism to explicate Britain’s exceptional constitution. He began by criticizing

6. Not all theorists see the British constitution as standing outside the broad stream of Western constitutionalism. See, e.g., Giovanni Sartori, Constitutionalism: A Preliminary Discussion, 56 POL. SCI. REV. 853 (1962).
Ironically, the American revolutionaries whose new constitution effectively buried the British constitution on the
global stage thought it provided the best historical exemplar of a constitution that preserved liberty. BAILYN,
supra note 3, at 66-67. They also believed, quite obviously, that they could improve on the British constitution.
7. See MARTIN LOUGHLIN, THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 6-41 (2013); ERIC
BARENDT, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 26-45 (1998).
8. THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN: BEING AN ANSWER TO MR. BURKE’S ATTACK ON THE FRENCH
REVOLUTION 47 (Prometheus Books 1987) (1791).
9. ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG, & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS
(2009).
10. A.V. DICEY, AN INTRODUCTION INTO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (1967).
11. A.V. DICEY, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM (J.W.F. Allison ed., 2013).
12. STEPHEN GARDBAUM, THE NEW COMMONWEALTH MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: THEORY AND
PRACTICE (2013).
13. DICEY, supra note 11, at 157.
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the term “unwritten constitution,” which is commonly used to refer to the British constitution, as a “lax and popular one.”14 There is no single document called the British constitution, but many of its key principles can be found written down in statutes and cases. The
real difference between the British and American constitutions, he argued, is that while
some constitutions are “made,” others have “grown” over time.15 The British constitution
has four distinctive characteristics not readily found “in the constitutions of other countries,” which are antiquity, continuity, spontaneity, and originality. 16
The antiquity and continuity of the British constitution derives from an important
conceptual distinction between the American and British constitutions. The American constitution is something separate and apart from the government.17 The principles of the British constitution, on the other hand, are largely derived from the “best” practices of the
British government.18 There is no clear analytical distinction between the constitution and
the government since the constitution is understood in light of what the British government
does.19 A rich literature examines British constitutional history and celebrates how British
institutions safeguard liberty or decries their failure to do so.20 The story of the British
constitution, in short, is the story of how its ancient and continuous political practices
evolved over time.21
The most important difference between the British and American constitutions turns
on what Dicey termed spontaneity. The British constitution, Dicey argued, is the “undesigned result of spontaneous efforts suggested at different moments”22 and resembles,
therefore, an old mansion,
[W]hich instead of being built all at once, after a regular plan, and according to the rules of architecture at present established, has been
reared in different ages of the art, has been altered from time to time,
and has been continuously receiving additions and repairs suited to the
taste, fortune, or conveniency of its successive proprietors.23
The unplanned nature of the British constitution differs markedly from the conceptual underpinnings of the American constitutional project. The American Constitution is
the product of the Enlightenment, when faith in reason was virtually unassailable 24 and

14. Id. at 22. For a searching critique of the use of the term “unwritten” to refer to the British constitution,
see ADAM TOMKINS, PUBLIC LAW (2003).
15. DICEY, supra note 11, at 172.
16. Id. at 174.
17. CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN 1-22 (1947).
18. BARENDT, supra note 7, at 26-34; LOUGHLIN, supra note 7, at 5-39.
19. For a classic statement of this position, see J.A.G. Griffith, The Political Constitution, 42 MOD. L. REV.
1 (1979).
20. BARENDT, supra note 7, at 26-34; LOUGHLIN, supra note 7, at 5-39.
21. In the United States, on the other hand, there is considerable disagreement over the role that evolving
political practices should play in construing the constitutional text. Living constitutionalists are more likely to
look favorably upon political practices in interpreting the Constitution than are originalists. See, e. g., N.L.R.B.
v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
22. DICEY, supra note 11, at 183.
23. Id. at 182 (internal citation omitted).
24. See AMERICA AND ENLIGHTENMENT CONSTITUTIONALISM (Gary L. McDowell & Jonathan O’Neill eds.,
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consequently, people across the Atlantic world began writing down and codifying systems
of customary law.25 Hamilton neatly captured this distinction in the very first of the Federalist Papers, when he asked “whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined
to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force.”26
Lastly, Dicey argued that the British constitution is “not in any sense a copy of any
foreign” constitution.27 The same, he argued provocatively, cannot be said of other constitutions as even “American constitutionalism is primarily and mainly based upon English
ideas.”28 The American revolutionaries believed the British constitution to be a fine model
worthy of emulation. Their core complaint was not that the British constitution was defective, but that “in their case the principles of the constitution had been violated.”29 In particular, the principle of separation of powers and the “form” of the United States constitution were “borrowed from England.”30 Dicey conceded, though, that a written constitution
that is superior to the government is an important departure from British constitutionalism
that “worked a far greater change in the nature of the constitution itself than American
constitutionalists probably realized.”31
Writing in an era when written constitutions were rapidly displacing unwritten
32
ones, Dicey unsurprisingly sought to defend the virtues of an historical constitution: “Political arrangements . . . which have been framed to meet an actual want are likely to
achieve their immediate object, and having endured have probably met the requirements
of the time.”33 The point Dicey makes is one that Thomas Paine and Edmund Burke famously disagreed on. In the wake of the French Revolution, Burke wrote an impassioned
defense of British common law constitutionalism. 34 Burke contended that it was a mistake
to seek radical constitutional transformation because the past was an important source of
stability.35 Thomas Paine wrote Rights of Man: Being an Answer to Mr. Burke’s Attack on
the French Revolution in response.36 Paine criticized Burke and argued that reason, not
tradition, should be the touchstone of constitutionalism.37 Dicey’s defense of Britain’s tra-

2006). The key events that transformed the British constitution—the English revolution and bill of rights—occurred before Enlightenment ideas came into vogue. LOUGHLIN, supra note 7, at 14-18.
25. While Americans were busy codifying their public law arrangements in 1787, the French turned to codifying their private law in 1804. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW
TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 27-31 (2007).
26. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton).
27. DICEY, supra note 11, at 20.
28. Id. at 76.
29. Id. at 77.
30. Id. at 78-79.
31. Id. at 78.
32. Even in the British Commonwealth, written constitutions were becoming the norm. Canada, for example,
adopted the British North America Act in 1867 and Australia adopted the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act in 1900.
33. DICEY, supra note 11, at 187.
34. See EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (J.G.A. Pocock ed., Hackett Publ’g
Co. 1987) (1790).
35. Id. at 217.
36. See PAINE, supra note 8.
37. Id. at 40-41.
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ditional constitution is not as famous as Burke’s, but it is one that comparative constitutionalists should pay attention to. The long-term success of the British constitution in preserving liberty suggests that it contains lessons that partisans of written constitutions can
ill afford to ignore.
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION
Although judicial review first became linked with written constitutions in 1803,38
the practice of writing and entrenching constitutions spread more rapidly around the globe
than did judicial review.39 Prior to World War II, many written constitutions were enforced
by elected officials, not judges. The logic of Marbury has proven irresistible,40 however,
and contemporary written constitutions are almost invariably associated with judicial review.41 The British constitution, on the other hand, long resisted the American idea that
judges should play an outsize role in protecting liberties. The key principle of British and
commonwealth constitutionalism is that Parliament enjoys constitutional and legislative
supremacy. It is understandably difficult to accommodate constitutional judicial review,
which gives judges the power to authoritatively explicate the constitution, with the principle of parliamentary sovereignty. 42 In any case, the British generally believed that their
existing constitutional arrangements worked tolerably well until the 1960s.43 In 1997, the
Labor Party won a landslide victory that enabled it to undertake a number of constitutional
reforms.44 One of those reforms was the Human Rights Act of 1998 which moved Britain
into the modern constitutional world by empowering judges to construe rights. 45
Stephen Gardbaum’s The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism examines the distinctive manner in which a handful of commonwealth nations—the United
Kingdom, New Zealand, and Canada—adapted judicial review to the strong role historically played by Parliament in protecting rights. 46 Each of these polities constitutionalized
rights and empowered judges to construe bills of rights in the late twentieth century.47
Rights protection had long been conceptualized as a bipolar world in which either judges—
the American model—or legislators—the British model—had the final constitutional
word.48 There has been considerable debate over the merits of the two systems.49 Professor
38. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
39. Miguel Schor, Mapping Comparative Judicial Review, 7 WASH. U. L. REV. 257, 261-70 (2008).
40. Miguel Schor, The Strange Cases of Marbury and Lochner in the Comparative Constitutional Imagination, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1463, 1466 (2009).
41. GARDBAUM, supra note 12, at 2-4.
42. An unwritten constitution with a powerful legislature makes it difficult but not impossible for judicial
review to take root. The Israeli Supreme Court successfully managed to do so in spite of Israel’s lack of a written
constitution. See CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Village, 49(4) PD 221 [1995] (Isr.).
43. VERNON BOGDANOR, THE NEW BRITISH CONSTITUTION 3-4 (2009).
44. Id. at 42.
45. Id. at 59-60.
46. GARDBAUM, supra note 12, at 2-4.
47. See DAVID ERDOS, DELEGATING RIGHTS PROTECTION: THE RISE OF BILLS OF RIGHTS IN THE
WESTMINSTER WORLD (2010).
48. GARDBAUM, supra note 12, at 1.
49. Compare, for example, Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J.
1346 (2006), with Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial Review, 121 HARV. L. REV.
1693 (2008). Contemporary works on the British constitution disagree on the advisability of adopting constitutional judicial review. Compare LOUGHLIN, supra note 7, and TOMKINS, supra note 14 (both authors take a
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Gardbaum argues that the Commonwealth model of constitutionalism “represents a third
approach” to constitutional protection that “occupies the intermediate ground in between
the two traditional and previously mutually exclusive options of legislative and judicial
supremacy.”50
The Commonwealth model of judicial review consists of “two novel techniques for
protecting rights”—“mandatory pre-enactment political rights review and weak-form judicial review.”51 The first requires that legislators deliberate over the constitutionality of
proposed legislation.52 This differs markedly from the practice in nations with legalized
constitutions where ex ante political review tends to be “ad hoc, voluntary and unsystematic.”53 In the United States, for example, a natural division of labor has emerged where
Congress focuses on policy issues and generally leaves constitutional issues to the Supreme Court.54 The vigorous exercise of judicial review by courts may debilitate elected
officials from taking on a function that does not have an electoral pay-off.55 In a modern
democracy, moreover, elected officials have a number of different issues that occupy their
time, ranging from servicing constituents to raising money for re-election. By institutionalizing ex ante political review, the new Commonwealth model squarely places constitutional issues on the agenda of elected officials. 56
The second aspect of the new Commonwealth model is that it institutionalizes weakform judicial review.57 Courts are empowered to review whether legislation comports with
a polity’s bill of rights. This is a departure from the classic British constitutionalism that
Dicey analyzed in the late nineteenth century when elected officials authoritatively determined rights. Courts do not have the final word, though, over the meaning of the Constitution as elected officials may override58 or ignore judicial decisions.59 The new Commonwealth model differs formally from the strong form of judicial review practiced in the

skeptical view towards legalizing the British constitution), with BARENDT, supra note 7, and BOGDANOR, supra
note 43 (both authors argue in favor of legalizing the British constitution).
50. GARDBAUM, supra note 12, at 1.
51. Id. at 25.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 25-26.
54. See J. MITCHELL PICKERILL, CONSTITUTIONAL DELIBERATION IN CONGRESS: THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW IN A SEPARATED SYSTEM 20-22 (2004). Members of Congress are more likely to debate constitutional
issues when there is substantial political controversy over legislation or when there is a concrete threat of a
judicial veto. Id. at 65-66.
55. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L.
REV. 129, 156 (1893).
56. GARDBAUM, supra note 12, at 26.
57. Id.
58. The notwithstanding clause of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, for example, allows legislatures to temporarily override constitutional interpretations of many charter rights. See Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms § 33, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11
(U.K.). The efficacy of the provision is questionable as elected officials seldom rely on it to overrule the Canadian
Supreme Court. Miguel Schor, Judicial Review and American Constitutional Exceptionalism, 46 OSGOODE HALL
L.J. 535, 559-60 (2008).
59. The British Human Rights Act (“HRA”) constitutionalizes the European Convention on Human Rights
by making convention rights enforceable in British courts. GARDBAUM, supra note 12, at 156-61. Section 4 of
the HRA empowers courts to declare that laws are incompatible with convention rights but it is up to Parliament
to determine how to proceed. Id. at 157-58. The HRA “separates the judicial power to review legislation for
compatibility with protected rights from the power to invalidate or disapply legislation deemed incompatible.”
Id. at 158.
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United States. Formally speaking, the Supreme Court has the last word in constitutional
interpretation unless its decisions are overruled by constitutional amendment. In practice,
though, strong form review shares some of the characteristics of weak form review, as
long-term shifts in public opinion mark the outer boundaries of what courts may do. 60 By
affording elected officials the final word over constitutional interpretation, the new Commonwealth model decouples judicial review from judicial supremacy.
Gardbaum persuasively argues that there is a constitutional pay-off to the new Commonwealth model.61 Pre-enactment review enables politicians to play a constructive role
in shaping rights discourse. The language used by courts often gives short shrift to moral
and practical issues that elected officials, who are not constrained by formal tests and rules,
may be better able to articulate.62 In any democracy, however, elected officials may seek
to override unpopular rights and are likely to ignore those that are not politically salient. 63
Weak form review addresses these issues by empowering courts to effectuate constitutional rights. A bill of rights, coupled with judicial review, moreover, fosters “public
recognition” of rights,64 which helps obviate the problem that rights inscribed on parchment may be ignored in practice.65 Courts, though, suffer from pathologies when effectuating rights. Courts make mistakes, thereby undermining democratic self-governance.66
Nor are courts as adept as legislatures in reaching compromises that the citizenry will accept.67 Providing elected officials with the final word over constitutional interpretation
addresses these problems. The new Commonwealth model, in short, produces a “better,
more democratically defensible balance of power between courts and legislatures.” 68
CONCLUSIONS
Britain is the world’s oldest liberal democracy yet constitutional theorists have
largely ignored its peculiar constitutional arrangements. A.V. Dicey’s recently published
Comparative Constitutionalism and Stephen Gardbaum’s The New Commonwealth Model
of Constitutionalism make a persuasive case that it is a mistake to ignore British constitutionalism. As Americans find themselves trapped in endless disagreements over whether
evolving political practices should be celebrated or reviled in constitutional interpretation,
and over whether the Supreme Court or the people is the master of the Constitution, they

60. See Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as National Policy Maker, 6
J. PUB. L. 279 (1957), reprinted in 50 EMORY L.J. 561 (2001); BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE:
HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE
CONSTITUTION (2009).
61. GARDBAUM, supra note 12, at 47-66, 222-44.
62. Thayer, supra note 55, at 138. See also Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review,
115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1381-84 (2006).
63. For two classic descriptions of this problem, see United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 155
n.4 (1938) and JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1981).
64. GARDBAUM, supra note 12, at 55.
65. See Daryl Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124
HARV. L. REV. 657 (2011).
66. This problem is typically associated with Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) and its progeny. See
HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS
JURISPRUDENCE (1993).
67. The unceasing political disagreement in the United States over abortion suggests that judicial constitutional supremacy may undermine the ability of political actors to compromise over deeply contested moral issues.
See Schor, supra note 5, at 11-13.
68. GARDBAUM, supra note 12, at 74-75.
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could do worse than look at constitutional developments in the polity that the framers, at
least, believed provided a fine model of how liberty might be protected.
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